We are living in Digital Era!
Monday, March 30, 2015
Progressive Classroom – ‘Required Change in Culture’ - By Eswar Vadya
We are living in Digital Era!
Wednesday, March 4, 2009
To nationalise or not – that is the question
Lindsey Graham, the Republican senator, Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, and James Baker, Ronald Reagan’s second Treasury secretary, are in favour. Ben Bernanke, current Fed chairman, and an administration of liberal Democrats are against. What is dividing them? “Nationalisation” is the answer.
In 1978, Alfred Kahn, an adviser on inflation to President Jimmy Carter, used the word “depression”. So angry was the president that Mr Kahn started to call it “banana” instead. But the recession Mr Kahn foretold happened all the same. The same may well happen with nationalisation. Indeed, it already has: how else is one to describe the actions of the federal government in relation to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG and increasingly Citigroup? Is nationalisation not already the big financial banana?
Much of the debate is semantic. But underneath it are at least two big issues. Who bears losses? How does one best restructure banks?
Banks are us. Often the debate is conducted as if they can be punished at no cost to ordinary people. But if they have made losses, someone has to bear them. In effect, the decision has been to make taxpayers bear losses that should fall on creditors. Some argue that shareholders should be rescued, too. But, rightly, this has not happened: share prices have indeed collapsed. That is what shareholders are for.
Yet the overwhelming bulk of banking assets are financed through borrowing, not equity. Thus the decision to keep creditors whole has huge implications. If we accept Mr Bernanke’s definition of “nationalisation” as a decision to “wipe out private shareholders”, we can call this activity “socialisation”.
What are its pros and cons?
The biggest cons are two. First, loss-socialisation lowers the funding costs of mega-banks, thereby selectively subsidising their balance sheets. This, in turn, exacerbates the “too big to fail” problem. Second, it leaves shareholders with an option on the upside and, at current market values, next to no risk on the downside. That will motivate “going for broke”. So loss-socialisation increases the need to control management. The four biggest US commercial banks – JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America and Wells Fargo – possess 64 per cent of the assets of US commercial banks (see chart). If creditors of these businesses cannot suffer significant losses, this is not much of a market economy.
The “pro” of partial socialisation is that it eliminates the risk of another panic among creditors or spillovers on to investors in the liabilities of banks, such as insurance and pension funds. Since bank bonds are a quarter of US investment-grade corporate bonds, the risk of panic is real. In the aftermath of the Lehman debacle, the decision appears to be that the only alternative to disorderly bankruptcy is none at all. This is frightening.
The second big issue is how to restructure banks. One point is clear: once one has decided to rescue creditors, recapitalisation can no longer come from the debt-into-equity swaps normal in bankruptcies.
This leaves one with government capital or private capital. In practice, both possibilities are at least partially blocked in the US: the former by political anger; the latter by a wide range of uncertainties – over the valuation of bad assets, future treatment of shareholders and the likely path of the economy. This makes the “zombie bank” alternative, condemned by Mr Baker in the FT on March 2, a likely outcome. Alas, such undercapitalised banking zombies also find it hard to recognise losses or expand their lending.
The US Treasury’s response is its “stress-testing” exercise. All 19 banks with assets of more than $100bn are included. They are asked to estimate losses under two scenarios, the worse of which assumes, quite optimistically, that the biggest fall in gross domestic product will be a 4 per cent year-on-year decline in the second and third quarters of 2009 (see chart). Supervisors will decide whether additional capital is needed. Institutions needing more capital will issue a convertible preferred security to the Treasury in a sufficient amount and will have up to six months to raise private capital. If they fail, convertible securities will be turned into equity on an “as-needed basis”.
This, then, is loss-socialisation in action – it guarantees a public buffer to protect creditors. This could end up giving the government a controlling shareholding in some institutions: Citigroup, for example. But, say the quibblers, this is not nationalisation.
What then are the pros and cons of this approach, compared with taking institutions over outright? Douglas Elliott of the Brookings Institution analyses this question in an intriguing paper. Part of the answer, he suggests, is that it is unclear whether banks are insolvent. If Nouriel Roubini of the Stern School in New York were to be right (as he has been hitherto), they are. If not, then they are not (see chart). Professor Roubini has suggested, for this reason, that it would be best to wait six months by when, in his view, the difficulty of distinguishing between solvent and insolvent institutions will have gone; they will all be seen to be grossly undercapitalised.
In those circumstances, the idea of “nationalisation” should be seen as a synonym for “restructuring”. Few believe banks would be best managed by the government indefinitely (though recent performance gives some pause). The advantage of nationalisation, then, is that it would allow restructuring of assets and liabilities into “good” and “bad” banks. The big disadvantages are inherent in organising the takeover and then the restructuring of such complex institutions.
If it is impossible to impose losses on creditors, the state could well own huge banks for a long time before it is able to return them to the market. The largest bank restructuring undertaken by the US, before last year, was that of Continental Illinois, seized in 1984. It was then the seventh largest bank and yet it took a decade. How long might the restructuring and sale of Citigroup take, with its huge global entanglements? What damage to its franchise and operations might be done in the process?
We are painfully learning that the world’s mega-banks are too complex to manage, too big to fail and too hard to restructure. Nobody would wish to start from here. But, as worries in the stock market show, banks must be fixed, in an orderly and systematic way. The stress tests should be tougher than now planned. Recapitalisation must then occur. Call it a banana if you want. But bank restructuring itself must begin.
By Martin Wolf - FT.com March 3 2009
Household Debt Vs. GDP
This chart tracks the relationship between household debt and gross domestic product. You'll see two years when Americans' debt becomes 100 percent of GDP -- 1929 and 2007.
It's the chart that made Columbia professor David Beim say:
"The problem is us. The problem is not the banks, greedy though they may be, overpaid though they may be. The problem is us... We've been living very high on the hog. Our living standard has been rising dramatically in the last 25 years. And we have been borrowing much of the money to make that prosperity happen."
Laura Conaway, NPR Org
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
How Nationalization Found a Way Into My Vegetable Soup
ERP Made Easy? Software developers are rediscovering the virtues of user-friendliness
In the early 1980s, the designers of Kwik-Chek, Intuit's first personal-finance package, set a bold goal: a novice PC user should be able to install the software and print a check within 15 minutes. Developers whisked people off the streets of Palo Alto, California, and timed them with a stopwatch, tweaking the program after each test. Thus began a whole new facet of software design, focused on making sure high-tech products were user-friendly.
A quarter-century later, entire companies are built around the need for software usability, and research centers and academic journals are devoted to it. Microsoft alone has 43 usability labs. Nevertheless, a funny thing happened on the way to software-usability nirvana: while many consumer apps became easy enough for a five-year-old to use, much business software continued to baffle grown-ups.
"Ten to 15 years ago you had better software at work than at home," says Dan Matthews, the Sweden-based chief technology officer of IFS, an enterprise resource planning (ERP) vendor. Then the Web took off. "The Internet produced an instant mass market. Developers building a service [for consumers] on the Internet couldn't call the user to come in for a training session, so their tools had to be designed to be picked up intuitively."
Meanwhile, business apps like enterprise software became more and more complex. In a survey conducted last year by IFS, 20 percent of enterprise-software users said their top causes of wasted time were learning different modules and applications and just trying to find task-related information.
Data like that should rattle managers. For one thing, says Matthews, productivity is not just about doing things faster, but also about not wasting time. Also, the success of ERP rollouts hinges on end-users actually adopting the applications in their daily work. "If you ask CFOs, they don't really care about how delighted employees are about using the new software," Matthews says. "But they do care about how many months there are between when the software goes live and when employees are regularly updating time and expense reports in the system, or project managers are using it for planning."
Mass Appeal
In what looks like the beginning of a welcome trend, some enterprise- software vendors are putting renewed emphasis on usability. IFS is currently testing an Enterprise Explorer interface that emulates the look and feel of consumer applications, predominantly a Web browser. "No one knows all the information there is on the Internet; enterprise software is the same way," Matthews says. "We have 7,000 different forms in the IFS applications." With the new interface, IFS users can navigate via hyperlinks and search windows instead of modules and folders.
Agresso Software is currently working on a new version of its ERP system with help from a user-interaction and -design company. The challenge is to come up with a design that has broad appeal. "In the past when you developed finance systems you were covering the core of a company, maybe 100 users," says Ton Dobbe, vice president of marketing. "Now the number of users is six or seven times that."
Microsoft is taking a tailored approach to usability with its Dynamics NAV software. The system features the company's "role tailored" user interface, which is designed around the individual user and his or her job function. The goal of role-tailored design is to "take out the 90 percent of the app that is not needed in that job," says Jakob Nielsen, a principal user-experience manager at Microsoft. To develop the interface, Microsoft built a customer model that describes 61 corporate "personas," or user profiles, and the core activities, interactions, pain points, and psychographics of each. One persona, for example, is Phyllis the Accounting Manager, for whom an acute pain point is the tedium of correcting posted transactions.
Design of the Times
With this refreshed perspective on usability, ERP developers are vying to make their software attractive to young workers, who have grown up with a new generation of technology. This may require looking beyond the browser model. A piece of business software doesn't have to look and feel exactly like, say, Apple's iPhone, but it needs to be "a designed product," says Matthews. When a company rolls out a new ERP system, employees should be excited about taking that first test drive, he says.
Well, maybe. Given how uninspiring most ERP software is right now, that may be setting the bar too high. Most users (and executives) would be satisfied with software that makes tasks simple to execute — as simple as, say, printing a check.
Vincent Ryan is a senior editor at CFO.